PALS in Pakistan Part Nine - Reassembly Risks
This is also far-fetched given that any technology transfer
program would occur with public knowledge and at the very least
an Indian notification. U.S. assurances that the assembly has
peaceful purposes should be enough to deter any Indian response.
It is also unclear as to why India would perceive the assembly
as any more dangerous than Pakistan's status quo nuclear
policies. Pakistan has a "First Use" policy in which it will
consider being the state to ratchet up a conventional war to the
nuclear level (Cotta-Ramusino and Martellini). It has also
clearly defined under what conditions it would use nuclear
weapons, and short of the transfer program occurring during an
India-Pakistan war India is unlikely to perceive the reassembly
as a veiled threat to use the weapons (Cotta-Ramusino and
Martellini). Addressing this concern is simply a matter of
constructing the transfer program in a way that is sensitive to
India's interests and perspectives. Solutions might include
giving PALS to both India and Pakistan simultaneously,
diplomatic assurances to India about the nature of the program,
or timing the program so that it occurs during a period of
relatively low hostilities. Another objection made is that the
United States would damage its credibility abroad in deterring
proliferation by being seen as cooperating with Pakistan's
nuclear weapon's program (Limaye). By openly cooperating with
Pakistan, this argument holds that we would be legitimating
their nuclear program and would send a signal to other states
that there would be few, if any, consequences to developing
nuclear weapons.