PALS in Pakistan Part Four - A Nuclear Precedent
The decision to provide another nuclear power with PALS
technology is not unprecedented. The United States has
transferred the technology successfully to Britain, France, and
even to the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the Cuban missile
crisis (Man). Pakistan has made indirect overtures to the United
States in what seems to be a bid to obtain the devices, with
Pakistani officials making public suggestions to their U.S.
counterparts that cooperation of the U.S. with Pakistan on
nuclear safety issues is an imperative given their relative
inexperience with safety systems and nuclear weapons in general
(Man). In the aftermath of September 11th, the U.S. began
seriously mulling the option of providing some sort of technical
assistance to install PALS on Pakistan's weapons (LaMontagne).
Momentum for this proposal increased as several incidents
highlighted the dominance of Pakistan's nuclear program by
Taliban supporters. Two Pakistani nuclear scientists were
detained by Pakistan's military after being discovered in
extensive contact with the Taliban government (Barry). In
October of 2001, the Bush administration invited Pakistani
officials to tour U.S. nuclear installations and made public
statements through several officials supporting the idea of
technical assistance to Pakistan to secure their weapons
(Wagner). While U.S. policymakers were considering the option,
the Indian parliament was attacked and the idea seems to have
been shelved while the U.S. engaged in frantic negotiations
between India and Pakistan. The primary reason to provide PALS
is simply because of the multitude of dangers that could
threaten the Pakistani arsenal. While each of these
possibilities may be remote, even a small risk of a nuclear
attack on any country is something that should be avoided if
possible. The damage that such an attack would cause is simply
too great, and the U.S. should have a response prepared for even
the most remote contingencies. The main benefit of PALS is that
they give the Pakistani government far greater control of their
arsenal in any of these scenarios. A 12 digit code would be
virtually impossible to decrypt without setting off one of the
charges on the PAL, and even if the codes were compromised
somehow, the government would retain the option of remotely
disabling the weapons (Bellovin). The cost of installing these
devices on thirty or so weapons would be minimal as well - at
most the project would cost several million dollars, which is an
excellent deal when compared to the billions spent disrupting
terrorism in Afghanistan (Bellovin). As long as the program is
tailored to avoid some of the pitfalls that opponents fear, the
costs of implementing it will pale in comparison to the
potential rewards.