CA Proposition 75 Paycheck Protection Act, An Analysis
Proposition 75, the so-called paycheck protection act claims to
protect union members from having their union dues used for
political purposes they do not agree with.
The Governor's offical website, JoinArnold.com says:
Proposition 75, also known as "Paycheck Protection," gives
workers the right to choose whether or not union dues money from
their paychecks should be used for political purposes.
This is total bahloney on the Governor's part.
The U.S. Supreme Court has already upheld, repeatedly, that
(a) the teacher's union (and all other unions) cannot use
our dues for political purposes without our consent, (b)
we can withdraw our consent at any time and thereby opt out of
their using our dues for poltical purposes, and (c) if we
opt out, the unions must provide a public accounting to prove
they did not use the dues against out will for political
purposes.
If you don't believe me, ask the U.S. Supreme Court. Here are
their decisons on the matter:
1. The U.S. Supreme Court, in International Association of
Machinists v. Street, [367 U.S. 740 (1961)] found that such
expenditures fall outside of the scope of reasons which
justified union shop agreements.
2. In 1963, the U.S. Supreme Court in Railway Clerks v.
Allen reaffirmed that, under Section 2, Eleventh of the
Railway Labor Act, labor unions cannot, over an employee's
objection, use exacted funds to support political activities
which such employees oppose [373 U.S. 113, 118-19 (1963)].
3. In 1977, the Supreme Court, in Abood v. Detroit Board
of Education, extended Street and Allen to encompass dissenting
non-union public employees [431 U.S. 209(1977)] basing its
decision, however, on constitutional grounds that were not at
issue in the prior cases. While a labor organization can
constitutionally expend funds for the expression of political
and ideological views which are not germane to its
collective-bargaining activities, it can only finance such
expenditures from the dues of non dissenting employees [Id.,
235-36]. Dissenting, non-union employees have a constitutional
First Amendment right to prevent a labor union from using a
proportionate share of their service fees for certain political
and ideological activities unrelated to the union's
collective-bargaining activities. [Id., 234. Cf., Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1976) in which the Supreme Court
held that contributions to organizations for the purpose of
spreading a political message were protected by the First
Amendment.]
4. In Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, the Court
was asked to determine the validity of a rebate scheme, in which
a labor union collected dues from employees and used them for
certain political and ideological activities, later paying a
rebate to employees who dissented from the political and
ideological use of such dues [466 U.S. 435 (1984)]. The Court
noted that under the rebate scheme the union obtains an
involuntary loan for those political and ideological activities
to which the dissenting employees object [Id., 443]. Since there
were readily available acceptable alternatives to such union
borrowing, such as advance reduction of dues and/or interest
bearing accounts, the Court found that a union cannot be allowed
to use the dissenting employees' funds even temporarily.
5. Two years later, in Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson
[475 U.S. 292 (1986)] the Supreme Court held that the
constitutional requirements for the union's collection of agency
fees from non-members would include: (1) an adequate
explanation for the basis of the fee; (2) a reasonably
prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before an
impartial arbitrator; and (3) the establishment of an
escrow fund for the amounts reasonably in dispute while any
challenges are pending.
In addition, the Congress has current proposals under
consideration would mostly codify the Supreme Court's decisions
in Street, Abood, Ellis, Chicago Teachers Union, Beck, and
Lehnert. These decisions have interpreted the NLRA and the RLA
as restricting the use of compulsory union dues by labor
organizations, providing for the disclosure of union
expenditures, and notifying employees of their right not to join
a union as a condition of employment (the payment of agency dues
or fees would be required). However, the various proposals tend
to go beyond the Court's interpretations of the statutes. One
major difference, which appears in several bills, is the
provision that prohibits labor organizations from collecting any
dues or fees not related to collective bargaining, contract
adminstration, or grievance adjustment unless the employee has
agreed, in writing, to pay such dues or fees.
[Sources and text above gleaned from The Use Of Union Dues
For Political Purposes: A Legal Analysis, by John
Contrubis and Margaret Mikyung Lee, American Law Division,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS; Number
97-618. http://countingcalifornia.cdlib.org/crs/ascii/97-618]
In short, repeated U.S. Supreme Court decisions have decisively
demonstrated that CA Public Employee Union members and agency
fee payers (a) can allow their union dues to be used for
political purposes, (b) can opt out anytime at a later
date if change their minds and do not want the union to use
their dues for political purposes, and (c) must be
clearly informed by the union of both (a) and (b) above.
So then what's the real purpose of Prop. 75? It sure isn't to
provide union members with the right to keep unions from using
our dues for purposes we disagree with, we've already had that
right for decades.
Jarrod J. Williamson, Ph.D.
We sleep safely in our beds because rough men stand ready in
the night to visit violence on those who would do us harm.