Trust Factor
Military formations have long sought to lessen the tension
between the rigidity of their organisational structures and the
need for quick, decisive, imaginative leadership plus
flexibility of movement on the battlefield. General George
Armstrong Custer's ego, for example, blinded him to the
realities of the situation at the Battle of the Little Big Horn,
and it cost many men their lives in consequence. The US Cavalry
of the nineteenth century seems to have lacked the
organisational checks-and-balances required to halt one man's
dangerous ambitions. But too much centralised control, red tape
and restraint can be just as risky as too little.
During Operation Mercury, the German airborne invasion of Crete
in May 1941, General Bernard Freyberg, the island's commander,
and his subordinates opted for an outdated static defence in the
face of aggressive, highly motivated but lightly armed
paratroops. It was largely thanks to Freyberg's autocratic style
of leadership and obsolete military thinking which allowed the
Germans to eventually wrestle control of the island away from
its Commonwealth defenders, a numerically superior force, and
impel a humiliating evacuation.
Not only did the Germans employ every technological advantage
available to them, but they also harnessed the esprit de corps,
or fighting spirit of the Fallschirmjaeger (paratroops), a
wholly new type of warrior. Unlike most of its adversaries at
the time the German military machine believed in swift campaigns
of strike and manoeuvre. By forming all available units into
Kampfgruppen, or Battlegroups, a local commander had the tools,
knowledge and freedom of action to ruthlessly exploit the
slightest weakness in the enemy line without hesitation. In
contrast, Freyberg's unit commanders exercised almost no freedom
of control over the battles they fought and lost.
You must grasp the full purpose of every enterprise, so that if
your leader be killed you can yourself fulfil it. 'Ten
Commandments of the German Parachutist', The Fall of Crete by
Alan Clark.
Typically, the British Army of the Second World War still
believed in training its soldiers to simply obey orders without
asking too many questions. Officers rarely took NCOs into their
confidence about operational matters, let-alone the rank and
file. Consequently, when a unit's officer was killed or badly
wounded there was no one ready to take command with enough
operational knowledge to complete the mission. The Germans
adopted a far more enlightened and pragmatic policy, whereby
every man was expected to be able to step into the shoes of his
direct superior. The German Army's system encouraged and
rewarded initiative, flexibility and daring. The result was a
crop of fine, resolute, gifted planners and aggressive leaders,
such as Erwin Rommel, Walther Model and Kurt Student. Only
later, as the war progressed, did the British and other Allied
armies start to gradually adopt similar methods.
Victory or defeat in the corporate sphere may not cost lives but
can certainly cost livelihoods. Rigid organisational structures
and strong corporate cultures can often do more to hobble talent
than harness it. Instead of fast-moving, flexible organisations
always ready to ruthlessly exploit a competitive advantage, many
companies are hindered by their own bureaucracy and an army of
timid, indecisive middle managers. For fear of making the wrong
decision, and being held accountable, these people make no
decisions. Instead they choose to endlessly analyse or
prevaricate. For far too long UK businesses have failed to
appreciate the importance of investing in professional
management training, internal communications and leadership
skills.
In many ways the German military approach can be likened to
Charles Handy's concept of a 'doughnut organisation', as
expressed in his book The Empty Raincoat. As a central
organising principle Handy suggests a balance between 'core'
roles, responsibilities or duties and a 'bounded space' where
initiative, daring and imagination can be expressed, cultivated
or tested. The major difference between a doughnut organisation
and a traditional hierarchy, whether commercial or military, is
one of trust.
The Allied commander of Crete saw no place for discretion or
freedom of action among his line officers. Strict control of
troop dispositions was supposed to ensure a predictable outcome.
This proved counter-intuitive, as it simply robbed line-officers
of their freedom of action; the ability to adapt to changing
circumstances on the battlefield. The German system also sought
to impose a regime of strict discipline and obedience within its
ranks. The Germans instilled an extreme sense of duty and
loyalty to the Fatherland within its troops. However, this was
tempered with trust in a shared vision, values and beliefs plus
a man's personal qualities, such as integrity, intelligence and
courage, as well as his professional talents. Men were
recognised, rewarded and quickly promoted for their daring,
inventiveness or inspired leadership. It's hardly surprising to
learn that many of Germany's senior commanders during the latter
stages of the war had been relatively junior officers at its
outbreak.
Today we see many variations of Charles Handy's doughnut
organisation as numerous enterprises finally come to realise
that bureaucracy tends to be cumbersome, unresponsive, costly
and uncompetitive. One example of just such a transformation is
the HM Treasury's National Savings and Investments agency
(NS&I). Until the late 1990s NS&I employed a staff of over 4,000
to develop, promote, sell and service its wide range of
government-backed saving and investment products such as ISAs
and Premium Bonds.
The new shape of work will centre around small organisations,
most of them in the service sector, with a small core of key
people and a collection of stringers or portfolio workers in the
space around the core. Charles Handy, The Empty Raincoat.
Finding itself increasing squeezed by new web-based entrants to
an already overcrowded financial services market, NS&I struck a
deal with Siemens Business Services (SBS). Siemens assumed
responsibility for the bulk of NS&I sales and back office
operations, excluding Post Office Counters Ltd. Over 3,500 NS&I
employees, mostly sales, customer service and accounts people,
transferred to SBS, securing their jobs and long term futures.
The remaining NS&I 'core people' were then trusted to
concentrate solely on the development, marketing, advertising
and launch of new financial products to the marketplace, or
enhance existing ones. SBS received a guaranteed 10-year
contract to run the NS&I call-centre plus its online and mail
order businesses. Having dramatically increased its sales force
almost overnight, Siemens could immediately compete for
additional service sector contracts. SBS also furnished NS&I
with the advanced IT systems necessary for them to get closer to
their customers, understand them better, explore new market
opportunities, and compete more effectively.
To deliver its products and services so they consistently
surpass customer expectations, its essential that a company's
brands, people, suppliers and partners are carefully aligned and
demonstrate a high level of interconnectedness. That same
organisational structure must also be flexible enough to
anticipate and adapt to changing customer needs, new
opportunities and competitive threats. An organisation's people
must be given trust, encouragement, focus and direction rather
than rules, regulations or limitations. Modern IT, IS and CRM
systems can also provide the necessary tools for quick,
confident decision-making, and sharing of corporate knowledge.
The process of gathering, assessing, sharing and, most
importantly, using information cannot be underestimated. The
fall of Crete clearly illustrates the point. History taught
General Freyberg that only a naval blockade or amphibious
assault could capture his island. That meant deploying many of
his men to defend the various ports, harbours or other small
anchorages that punctuated the coastline. The Germans had other
ideas. German strategy relied on surprise, speed and a radical
new form of airborne warfare. Success or failure hinged on the
paratroopers immediately seizing Crete's airfields rather than
its harbours.
To secure and hold the airfields German paratroops had to be
swiftly reinforced and replenished with food, ammunition and
medical supplies while their wounded were evacuated. The landing
strips would also provide a base from which to fly continuous
fighter and dive-bomber missions against the island's defenders.
Certainly Freyberg's men did defend the airfields, but both he
and they seem to have totally misjudged their strategic
importance. It was a simple enough equation: hold the airfields
and hold the island. Do this and any seaborne element of the
German invasion force would then be powerless to intervene.
However what made the loss of Crete such a bitter Allied defeat
was the fact that Freyberg, his superiors and political masters
knew exactly when, where and how the Germans intended to strike.
Thanks to the code-breakers of ULTRA having deciphered most of
the Luftwaffe's Enigma radio traffic, the secret of Operation
Mercury was out. Possession of this knowledge itself created a
dilemma for the Allies, or so argues historians and academics.
By acting on intelligence gained by ULTRA the Germans might be
alerted to its existence, and change their codes in response.
Faced with a potential intelligence blackout Allied High Command
had a difficult choice to make. Ultimately, they chose to
sacrifice the island rather than risk ULTRA.
Today, with the benefit of hindsight, it seems a highly
questionable decision not to have shared or fully exploited
ULTRA-gained intelligence for the defence of Crete. So what went
wrong? It seems that Allied planners no-longer trusted
themselves to make fair-minded strategic assessments or
recommendations based on situational analysis alone. Doubt
eroded their confidence, made them unnecessarily cautious, and
blinded them to the possibility of inflicting Germany's first
major defeat of the war. After all, the Germans knew that
airborne assaults were always hazardous adventures, and
something of a gamble. Crete's garrison was a well-equipped,
experienced and a numerically superior force, which should have
been quite capable of repelling an attack by lightly armed
infantry.
In truth, surprisingly little about the failure of Operation
Mercury would have given the Germans cause to question the
security of their Enigma codes. On the other hand, an Allied
victory at this juncture of the war would have been an enormous
boon, after so many defeats. Morale across Europe would have
soared while the myth of German invincibility would have finally
been dispelled. And this achieved just a month before the German
invasion of the Soviet Union. Strategically, the holding of
Crete would have made the Mediterranean a much more dangerous
place for German and Italian convoys, and placed greater
pressures on their forces in the Middle East.
The decision to protect the ULTRA secret was one thing, but the
failure to apply some sound military judgement in the defence of
Crete was quite another. Any Allied officer worthy of the name
should have learned some stark lessons about German strategic
thinking, and the tactical deployment of Special Forces like
paratroops since 1939, and planned accordingly. The
Fallschirmjaeger should have been completely overwhelmed when at
their most vulnerable: while aboard their slow and unarmed JU52
transport aircraft; during their descent; or just after landing,
before they could retrieve their weapons containers. Instead,
despite suffering initial heavy losses, the Germans were able to
adapt, overcome and finally win a truly stunning victory. As for
the Allies, their defeat had no single or readily identifiable
cause. Everything from poor communications to an inflexible
command structure contributed to their eventual overthrow. Of
course, the lesson to be learnt here is that if something as
intangible as trust, given or withheld at critical moments, can
decide the outcome of battles then think about what it can do
for your business.
Source: Battle Group! German Kampfgruppen Action of World War
Two, by James Lucas, Arm & Armour, London, 1993 Changing
Bureaucracies, William Antonio Medina, Marcel Dekker, 2001 Crete
- The Battle and Resistance, Anthony Beevor, John Murray
Publishers, 1991 The Empty Raincoat - Making Sense of the
Future, Charles Handy, Arrow Books Ltd, 1995 The Fall of Crete,
Alan Clark, cassell military paperbacks edition, 2001 The Lost
Battle, Crete 1941, Callum MacDonald, MacMillan, 1993