Conflict in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) PART I
India and Pakistan have in the past fought four wars over J&K
and held several talks to resolve the 56 year old problem, but
till now no tangible results have emerged, except for a
composite dialogue. Although, both India and Pakistan are trying
to move the peace process ahead, yet there are very few
indications in a policy shift. Pakistan continues to stick on to
the line of Kashmir remaining a dispute territory and an
'unfinished agenda' of Partition, India maintains its stand on
J&K "Accession document" which remains final and complete and
the problem which remains is cross border terrorism. Most
conflicts around the world remain unresolved; however, there are
exceptions and dialogues have resulted in signing peace
agreements like the signing of the Aceh accord, the Northern
Ireland peace accord and the diffusion of tension in the North
Korean nuclear issue after the six party talks. Notwithstanding
the above, tension is still rampant in a number of places after
a brief spell of peace and sensibility.
There are no 'rear lines' where democratic societies are safe
and actually a 'war against terror' is a misnomer, because it is
difficult to wage war against an unknown enemy. The phases of
conflict in J&K have followed different patterns and have been
terrain and climate driven. The shift in strategies in the
conflict has been dependent on the target and visibility, of a
seen or an unseen enemy of a stable or an unstable Government
and to apply appropriate pressures, the masters remotely
separated from ground situation, at times apathetic, institute
checks and balances through their respective styles of
governance. In this overall process, the centre of gravity, the
main focus of all strategies in combating terrorism, the people
of J&K have become secondary and the Security Forces deployed
for the security of the people, at times forget the purpose of
their stay resulting in a paradigm shift in the overall security
of the entire region. To offset the impasse, a continuous
process of refinement, in policies with changed scenarios,
keeping the new world order as a calibrated system of
progression, is an inescapable commitment for bringing about
peace and stability in the entire state of J&K.
Pattern of Conflict
The pattern of conflict has varied from a mix of seen and unseen
enemy presenting different targets in the State of J&K, to a
conventional type of declared war scenario. In the initial
phases of the first conflict of 1947-48, Maj Gen Akbar Khan of
the Pakistan Army orchestrated the infiltration of the
Kabailies, who created mayhem, in looting and arson in the
Kashmir Valley and at other places and tried to capture
Srinagar. They nearly succeeded in their effort and could only
be stalled in their tracks on the arrival of the Indian Army
troops on the 27th of October 1947, a day after the signing of
the 'Instrument of Accessation'. In 1965m Operation Gibraltar
with the Pakistan military disguised as civilians tried to make
inroads and incite the civilian population to rebel and tie the
security forces down while the Pakistani army would attack along
the Line of Control, a mix of seen and unseen enemy. The 14 days
war of 1971, which was fought in J&K was essentially a war with
a visible enemy and then came a phase of an unseen, insular
force which became difficult to identify a friend or foe and it
is 16 years since, which has given birth to the concept of a
proxy war or a limited war.
It will now be pertinent to see a shift in the pattern of the
proxy war scenario from 1989 onwards and the jig saw puzzle of
the change in locations of the thrust of the conflict will start
making sense when the inputs of terrain and demography are
meshed into it. The initial phase was concentrated in the
Valley, with the insurgency movement gaining impetus with the
kidnapping of the three Air Force personnel who were
subsequently killed. The problem spread in the Kashmir Valley
and the Security Forces came down heavily on them and the
requirement of raising a force to deal with the problem was
felt. The raising of the Rashtriya Rifles Force (RR) commenced
in 1990 and now the force boasts of strength of over 60
Battalions. The conflict then gained impetus on the higher
reaches of Shamshabari Ranges in the Kishtwar - Warwan areas and
though inputs on such camps were scanty, yet little action was
taken to confirm reports and to deal with the situation. The
focus shifted from predominantly Kashmir to Kishtwar and
Bhaderwah areas of the Doda District and efforts were made by
the insurgent tanzeems to become active during the second half
of 1990's, while near normalcy returned to the Valley. With the
attention of the security forces now focussed in the Jammu
Region, Pakistan in the guise of mujahaddin, occupied the Kargil
heights and tried to cut off the only life line to Ladakh.
However, with the importance attached to clearing the
opposition, the Pakistani designs were neutralised and again
till 2001, the overall situation improved. With some respite to
the security forces and with the requirements of the tanzeems
showing their prowess, it became important for their to
re-charge their struggle and the focus was once again to raise
the ante in the Kashmir Region with infiltration attempts on the
rise in the Jammu Division. However, when the situation became
difficult for the Security Forces in 2002-03, 'Sarp Vinash'
which caught the head lines in the months of May 2003, when the
Army launched 'Operation Sarp Vinash', which caught the
headlines in May 2003. Later, that year a unilateral declaration
of cease fire, along the Line of Control by Pakistan, and the
ferocity of operation reduced considerably.